It argues first of all that the latter transatlantic gap is receding in importance because the United States has adjusted its transformation approach and because a number of European allies have significantly invested in technological, doctrinal, and organizational reform.
This article takes stock of these gaps in light of a decade’s worth of collective and national adjustments and in light of counter-insurgency lessons provided by Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has since the turn of the century experienced a double transformation gap: between global and regionally oriented allies and between allies emulating new military practices defined by the United States and allies resisting radical change. Recommendations by official reports and by both military and non-military scholars are compiled and considered for improving PRT operations.
Knowledge of both Afghanistan and PRTs is necessary to determine the cause of problems and to develop solutions. The rising expectation of PRTs as a tool for nation-building and a non-kinetic weapon of counterinsurgency is diminishing as government corruption, the drug trade, terrorism, and lawlessness increase, particularly in the south and east. and ISAF expansion of the PRT program to more provinces. The relatively nominal cost in money and personnel, along with the positive reception of PRTs by provincial governments and the Afghan people, contributed to the U.S.
The expansion of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) beyond the capital was initiated by member countries taking over U.S.-established PRTs. It created Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) composed of specialized military teams and civilian government experts with the mission of improving security and governance and supporting reconstruction and development in the provinces and districts. military recognized that it needed a cost-effective, robust element that could assist the new Afghan government in extending its authority throughout the country. The historical defeat of Soviet forces, the ease of removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the reluctance of the Bush Administration to engage in nation-building resulted in a reluctance to commit a significant diplomatic, economic, and military effort. government’s unwitting involvement in nation-building and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 and the United States’ response resulted in the U.S.
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